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Alison Suen is an assistant professor of philosophy at
Iona College, New York. She received her BA in
Philosophy from the University of Northern Iowa in
2006, and her PhD in Philosophy from Vanderbilt
University in 2012. In 2015, she published The
Speaking Animal: Ethics, Language and the Human-
animal Divide with Rowman and Littlefield Interna-
tional. Her articles have appeared in philoSOPHIA: A
Journal ofContinental Feminism and Teaching Philo-
sophy. She is interested in various intersections
between feminist philosophy and animal ethics, and
her current research focuses on the ethics of con-
sumption.
Chloë Taylor is Associate Professor of Women’s and
Gender Studies at the University of Alberta. She has
a PhD in Philosophy from the University ofToronto
and was a postdoctoral fellow in the Philosophy de-
partment at McGill University. Her research interests
include twentieth-century French philosophy, philo-
sophy of gender and sexuality, food politics, critical
animal studies, and animal ethics. She is the author
of Foucault, Feminism, and Sex Crimes: An Anti-Car-
ceral Analysis (Routledge 2018) , The Routledge
Guidebook to Foucault’s The History of Sexuality
(Routledge 2016), andThe Culture ofConfession from
Augustine to Foucault (Routledge 2008), and co-edit-
or of Feminist Philosophies of Life (McGill-Queens
University Press 2016) and Asian Perspectives on
AnimalEthics (Routledge 2014) .
This cluster of articles proceeds from a symposiumfunded by both the Social Sciences and Human-
ities Research Council of Canada and Kule Institute
for Advanced Studies. The symposium took place in
March 2017 at the University of Alberta on the topic
of “Social Justice, Feminist Affects, and Philosophical
Futures: Responding to the Hypatia Controversy.”
Chloë Taylor, along with Ada Jaarsma ofMount Roy-
al University, was an organizer of this day-long sym-
posium, and Alison Suen was one of the seven
presenters at this event. Given that the significance of
lived experience for philosophical and social justice
scholarship was frequently highlighted over the course
of the original controversy, the organizers of this sym-
posium were careful to forefront the perspectives of
women-of-colour philosophers and social theorists
and trans scholars. Atlantis agreed to publish a partial
proceedings from this event and, as editors, we con-
tinued to be mindful of the importance of lived ex-
perience in seeking reviewers for this publication.
Although feminist philosophers remain painfully di-
vided over the events of April and May 2017, it is
agreed that these events raised an array of important
ethical, disciplinary, social, and methodological ques-
tions and marked a pivotal moment in the discipline.
As Namrata Mitra argues in her article included in
this issue, Rebecca Tuvel’s article was in fact an unex-
ceptional philosophical essay in terms of citational
practice and argumentative style, and yet it was
widely decried as having reinforced structural harms
to marginalized people. What does this say about the
norms of the tradition in which we, as feminist philo-
sophers, have been trained? Must we, as philosophers,
rethink our methods? Tuvel was criticized because, al-
though she is white and cisgender, she wrote on a
topic that most directly impacts trans people and
people of colour. This raises questions about who has
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the authority to speak in a discipline that has tradi-
tionally claimed to evaluate arguments based purely
on their purportedly objective logical merit. Given
the gravity of these questions, one of the primary
goals of this collection of essays is to explore the issue
of methodology in feminist philosophy. While the
three essays collected here come from different dis-
ciplines and traditions within and beyond philo-
sophy, they each expose presumptions hidden in the
methods that philosophers traditionally employ. We
believe this selection of essays contributes to conver-
sation regarding philosophical methods. We hope
that this collection will inspire philosophers and so-
cial justice theorists to continue to grapple with the
ethical import of their divergent methods.
* * * *
In “Benefits and Burdens of Engaging in Argumenta-
tion,” Stephanie Kapusta identifies two forms of “ar-
gumentation injustice” to which philosophers from
marginalized groups are particularly vulnerable. She
argues that certain traditional ways of doing philo-
sophy—in particular, the excessive focus on logical-
epistemic goals of argumentation—create two condi-
tions for injustice. First, it places disproportionate
burdens on philosophers who belong to marginalized
groups; second, it exposes these philosophers to harm
(both cognitive and emotional) . Kapusta persuasively
demonstrates that participants of an argumentational
exchange relate to the argument in different ways: for
some, it is an intellectual exercise; for others, it is of
existential import. Indeed, the latter could even ex-
perience psychological harm when they engage in an
argument that does not fully recognize their identity
and oppression. As such, philosophers experience
differential burdens and risks, despite the fact that a
philosophical exchange of reason is supposed to be
impartial. Using Tuvel’s essay as her case study,
Kapusta argues that insofar as trans* philosophers are
especially invested in argumentational exchanges that
concern their identity, they shoulder a disproportion-
ate burden (both cognitively and emotionally) when
they engage in such exchanges. For example, accord-
ing to Kapusta, there is an implicit misgendering in
Tuvel’s argument; specifically, Kapusta contends that
Tuvel’s argument inferentially excludes trans women
who do not pass as cisgender women, thereby reiter-
ating the transexclusionary micro-aggression found in
mainstream literature on philosophy of gender. “Non-
passing” trans woman philosophers who engage in
Tuvel’s argument are then burdened with the addi-
tional responsibility of having to show that they, too,
are women, while also suffering the psychological
harm ofhaving their identity denied.
For Kapusta, this argumentational injustice presents a
double bind. On the one hand, philosophers from
socially marginalized groups offer an indispensable
voice in arguments that concern their identity and
oppression: not only do they have vested, existential
interests in such debates, they are also more likely to
diagnose fallacies and problematic assumptions hid-
den within these arguments. On the other hand, en-
gaging these arguments can be taxing for philosophers
from socially marginalized groups: the disproportion-
ate burden and exposure to potential harm could fur-
ther alienate those whose voices are sorely needed in
these debates. To adequately address this double bind,
Kapusta calls for a “major ‘overhaul’ of the profes-
sional culture of philosophy.” Yet, given the difficulty
of such a monumental task, Kapusta ends her paper
by acknowledging the urgency for socially marginal-
ized philosophers to engage in debates that are dis-
proportionately burdensome and risky, “even if full
enjoyment of the enticing goods on offer is denied to
[them] ."
Kapusta’s essay invites us to consider important ques-
tions regarding our responsibilities as philosophers.
How can we argue responsibly? What can we respons-
ibly argue about? And perhaps more controversially,
who is responsible for engaging an argument? Implicit
in this call is the recognition that contexts matter. The
specific ways we have been trained to argue, as well as
the standard we use to evaluate an argument, are both
products of our professional culture. As such, to ad-
dress the injustice instantiated by certain argumenta-
tional practices, we must address the professional
culture from which such practices emerged.
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The issue of responsible argumentation and the ur-
gent need to interrogate our discipline take center
stage in Namrata Mitra’s “Disciplinary Matters in the
Hypatia Controversy.” In her essay, Mitra articulates
the importance of contextualization when theorizing
social and political issues. Like Kapusta, Mitra also
critiques a method of doing philosophy that has long
been the standard: specifically, she argues that the
method of abstraction favoured by traditional philo-
sophy often produces illusions of objectivity and uni-
versality. Mitra contends that the problem is not just
that we do “bad philosophy” when we presume our
particular history, context, and identity to be univer-
sal; beyond this, such a presumption has been com-
plicit in colonialism and other forms of oppression.
Drawing from both feminist and postcolonial literat-
ure, Mitra demonstrates how the exclusion of social-
historical context, the omission of marginal voices,
and the proclivity to stay in the comfort zone of ab-
straction, have long infected the discipline of philo-
sophy.
By drawing attention to the long history of decon-
textualization in philosophy, Mitra offers a helpful
way for us to understand and analyze the Hypatia
controversy. One of the main charges against Tuvel’s
article is that it did not sufficiently attend to the
“lived experience” or existing literatures of those
whose lives her article discusses. Her article has been
criticized for being too abstract, relying primarily on
a conceptual analogy between gender identification
and racial identification. While Mitra agrees with this
critique, she questions why Tuvel’s article was singled
out for retraction, as if the lack of contextualization
in her article was an aberration in professional philo-
sophy. Mitra suggests that, ironically, by singling out
Tuvel’s article, her detractors (or at least some of the
800-plus signatories of the Open Letter) seem to have
committed the very sin of which they believe Tuvel’s
article is guilty. That is, her detractors have also failed
to contextualize Tuvel’s essay within the broader his-
tory and culture of philosophy. They, too, have ab-
stracted Tuvel’s article from the tradition of
philosophy, where the lack of attention to social-his-
torical contexts is the norm rather than the exception.
Indeed, once we go beyond the confines of academic
philosophy and contextualize Tuvel’s article within the
broader social-political history in America, we can
begin a conversation on methodology in a more prof-
itable way. As mentioned above, one common charge
against Tuvel’s article is the argument’s reliance on
identity analogies. Critics of Tuvel have argued that
gender-identification and racial-identification are not
in fact analogous. Therefore, justifications for trans-
gender identification do not translate into justifica-
tions for transracial identification. Using the works of
Serena Mayeri and Janet Halley, Mitra examines the
efficacy and perils of various forms of identity analo-
gies in American civil rights advocacy. From the ana-
logy between the right to religious practice and queer
acceptance, to the analogy between sexual orienta-
tion-based discrimination and racial discrimination,
the use of identity analogies is commonplace in the
American legal and political landscape. While Mitra
does not explicitly analyze the analogy between
gender identification and racial identification, she
shows us that there is a wealth of literature on identity
analogies from which we could draw. According to
Mitra, rather than retracting Tuvel’s article, a more
productive way to engage with Tuvel’s argument is to
situate it within existing debates on identity analogies.
The issue of identity analogies becomes prominent in
the third essay of this collection. In “Allegories of
Gender: Transgender Autology versus Transracialism,”
Aniruddha Dutta offers a diagnosis of the discomfort
that many feel toward the transgender-transrace ana-
logy. Dutta frames the issue in the following question:
why are we more inclined to accept self-determination
with gender identification than with racial identifica-
tion? That is, why does gender allow for subjective
identification but not race? Tracing an ongoing effort
to decouple subjective identity from social position in
critical and activist discourses, Dutta offers a compel-
ling account of the ways gender has been “individual-
ized, interiorized, and dissociated from biological and
social determinism.” Following Foucault, Dutta high-
lights the confessional nature of gender identification:
like sexuality, gender as a core personal identity be-
comes a truth that one must confess. And insofar as
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our gender confessions correspond to, and avow, an
interiorized selfhood, they are immune to sociobiolo-
gical determinations. The individual is the ultimate
arbiter of their gender reality.
Significantly, racial identification does not permit the
kind of self-determination that we see in gender
identification. Rather, race is linked to ancestry,
primarily consanguineal ancestry. As such, racial
identity is something that one inherits socially or
biologically, rather than a matter of self-determina-
tion. However, the contention that racial identifica-
tion is a matter of consanguineal ancestry presumes a
hierarchy of kinship whereby blood relations are
privileged over the non-genetic, “chosen” ones. To ar-
ticulate the divergent ways we construct gender and
racial identifications, Dutta employs Elizabeth Pov-
inelli’s distinction between “autology” and “genea-
logy.” Whereas autology permits an individual to
justify their gender identity by appealing to the sup-
posed authenticity of the inner self, genealogy delim-
its racial identity with a “deterministic conflation of
sociobiological ancestry, subjective racial identity, and
racial (dis)privilege.” For Dutta, the anxiety sur-
rounding transracialism can be understood as an ef-
fort to maintain the boundaries that separate
autology and genealogy. The rigid separation can, as
Dutta argues, become an “oppressive generalization”
with which gender identity is inevitably tied to “con-
fessional technologies of power,” while racial identity
is predestined by sociobiological inheritance.
However, Dutta neither advocates for granting auto-
logy to all identity claims, nor do they deny the
political relevance of autology discourse. Rather,
Dutta’s analysis helps us to begin understanding why
many are troubled by the transgender-transrace ana-
logy. But more importantly perhaps, it is a reminder
that gender identification has not always been auto-
logical. Indeed, the widespread acceptance of gender
self-identification is the fruit of those who have
worked hard to dissociate gender identity from bio-
logical materiality. Acknowledging the historical con-
tingency of gender self-identification can perhaps
remind us that the way we determine racial identity
also has its own history and evolution.
